

Teleological Networks in Normative Systems

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1. Introduction

Motivation

- Teleological statements are especially found in the legislative workflow
 - governmental drafting; parliamentarian decisions; publication of the valid laws
- Law and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
 - Different methodological paradigms
 - Approaches
 - Via natural language
 - Via formal notation. This is our approach.
- Characterisation of legal order: many **implicit** and rare **explicit** teleological structures

Teleological structures in context

- “Goal” is not among fundamental legal concepts!?
 - However, in G. Sartor, 2006 “Fundamental legal concepts”
- Teleology
 - Berman & Hafner 1993; Bench-Capon; Prakken; Sartor etc in *AI and Law journal*, Vol.10 (2002), No.1-2
 - Goals
 - Interests, values
 - Purposes, policies
 - Intentions of a legislator
- Theory of teleological relations in law? Why not?

Teleological reasoning vs. norm-based reasoning

- General legal reasoning, especially by non-experts in law, is driven,
 1. primarily, by **purposes**,
 2. then by **norms**

2. Goals in Software Engineering


Our approach: to treat
a teleological network in law
similarly to the goal model in RE

Assumption: a statute is a system.

Conclusion: system design methods might
be used in legislative drafting.

- Teleological network in a statute ~
goal model in requirements engineering


Goals in software engineering




KAOS metamodel [Heaven, Finkelstein 2004]. KAOS – goal-oriented requirements engineering methodology, see van Lamsweerde

KAOS goal model

[Matulevičius, Heymans 2005]



Example: KAOS model for the London Ambulance Service system







See [Heaven, Finkelstein 2004], adapted from [Letier 2001]

Continued from [Heaven, Finkelstein 2004], adapted from [Letier 2001]


Textual goal syntax

Goal Achieve[AmbulanceAllocation
BasedOnIncidentForm]
Def For every *incident* form, an available *ambulance* able to arrive at the *incident* scene within 11 minutes should be allocated to the corresponding *location*. The ambulance *allocation* time should take no more than "allocation_delay" time units.
FormalDef $\forall c: \text{UrgentCall}, if: \text{IncidentForm}$
 $\quad @ if.\text{Encoded} \Rightarrow \exists_{\text{Allocation_delay}} (\exists ai: \text{AmbulanceInfo}, amb: \text{Ambulance}): ai.\text{Allocated}$
 $\quad \wedge ai.\text{AllocationDest} = if.\text{Location}$
 $\quad \wedge ai.\text{AmbID} = amb.\text{AmbID}$
 $\quad \wedge \bullet amb.\text{Available} \wedge \bullet \neg ai.\text{Allocated}$
 $\quad \wedge \bullet \text{TimeDist}(amb.\text{Location}, if.\text{Location}) \leq 11'$



Goals and agents

- Responsibility link assigns a goal to an agent.
A bottom level subgoal is related to an **agent**



- The agent is responsible for goal satisfaction
- **Agent** of a requirement ~ **subject** of a norm
- **Goal** and **agent** in requirements engineering
~ **telos** and **subject** in the law


Types of goals


- Different goal types
 - **Achieve** goals require that some property *eventually* holds. In deontic logic, $\diamond G$.
 - **Maintain** goals require that some property *always* holds. $\square G$.
 - **Cease** goals requires that some property *eventually stops* to hold. Negation of achieve.
 - **Avoid** goals require that some property *never* holds. Negation of maintain.
 - **Optimise, Test, Query, Perform, Preserve** [Braubach et al. 2004] about Belief-Desire-Intention agent systems


Expected usage


- Annotation of a statute with goals – a commentary
- Goal representation forms
 - Textual annotation
 - A network of goal identifiers
- An example to start: a constitution for Europe
 - Article I-2 The Union's values
 - Article I-3 The Union's objectives


3. Teleological Statements and the Context of Teleology




















Teleological Statement, Context




Teleological Statement, Context




Teleological Statement, Context



Teleological Statement, Context



Teleological Statement, Context



tec te-context { STM (a te-> b) }

teg te-goal a te-> b

tep te-projection STM (a te-> b)


ter te-relation a te-> b

tes te-statement STM (a te-> b)

tet te-tool a te-> b

4.


Explicit teleological element within the norm



Consider the structure of a norm to be composed of the following elements:


- (1) **Condition**
- (2) Disposition
 - (2.1) **Subject**. This is an actor;
 - (2.2) **Action**;
 - (2.3) Normative **modus** of the action;
 - (2.4) **Object** of the action.
- (3) **Telos** – the explicit teleological element of the norm.

We add the *telos*.




Example 1: “Open the door”

- (1) Condition: empty
- (2.1) Subject: implicit
- (2.2) Action: “open”
- (2.3) Modus: implicit in the verb “open”
- (2.4) Object: “the door”
- (3) Telos: empty




Example 2: “You must open the door”

- (1) Condition: empty
- (2.1) Subject: “you”
- (2.2) Action: “open”
- (2.3) **Modus:** “must”
- (2.4) Object: “the door”
- (3) Telos: empty



Example 3: “You must open the door for fresh air”

- (1) Condition: empty
- (2.1) Subject: “you”
- (2.2) Action: “open”
- (2.3) Normative modus of the action: “must”
- (2.4) Object the action: “the door”
- (3) **Telos: “for fresh air”**



Example 4: “Subject 1 must open the door for fresh air”

Formal notation (in the form of relation):


disposition **te**→ telos

Notation within the elements of a norm:

$O_{s1}(a \rightarrow b)$ **te**→ c

Notation in algorithmical language:

```
norm( condition=empty,
      disposition( subject=s1, action=a, modus=o, object=b ),
      telos=c )
```



Example 4: “Subject 1 must open the door for fresh air”

Visualization:

The teleological relation is depicted by a sharp green transparent triangle.

External and internal teleology of the norm

- **External teleology**

$$norm(A) \ te \rightarrow G$$

E.g. $A = open_door$ and $G = fresh_air$

$A = close_door$ and $G = security$

- **Internal teleology**

$$norm(A \ te \rightarrow G)$$

E.g. “Open the door for fresh air”

Variations of teleology within the content of a norm

$te \rightarrow$ $te \rightarrow$ $te \rightarrow$
 \updownarrow \updownarrow \updownarrow
norm(condition, action, telos)


Symbolisation and formalisation

- **Symbolisation** is more or less domain notation like $te \rightarrow$.
- **Formalisation** is a correct logical notation.
- The relation between them:
 $norm(A te \rightarrow G)$ does not necessarily imply
 $N te \rightarrow G$
- In other words:

$$norm(A te \rightarrow G) \neq N te \rightarrow G$$


5. Explicit teleological Statements within and outside the Law

Teleological Structure within the Law




preamble of a regulation


Teleological Structure concerning the Norm



Normative Teleological Statement




Teleological Statement, Norm as Tool



juridical commentaries upon an article of a law

Teleological Statement, Norm as Goal



political commentaries upon a legislative initiative

6. Teleological Networks and Legal Knowledge Representation

n1



n2

n3

n....

Norms

MIS Modal Indifferent Substratum



MIS Modal Indifferent Substratum


a b c ... n

o_{n1} o_{n2} o_{n7} o_{n33}



o_{n17} o_{n7}

p_{n20} p_{n42}


representation
of normative modalities
within MIS-Semantics



MIS Modal Indifferent Substratum



representation
of te-structures
within MIS-Semantics



7. Summary

(1) Formal analysis of goals is utilized in **systems engineering. We aim to apply goals (teleology) in legal knowledge representation.**

(2) Teleology can be associated with different **elements of a norm.**

(3) Textual statements concerning legal goals are mostly rational. Therefore **explicit instruments (like formalisation and symbolisation) are adequate.**

(4) From the viewpoint of legal knowledge representation the normative layer of a legal system can be supplemented with a teleological layer.

(5) Teleology appears both inside and outside of a legal system.

*Thank you
for your
attention*

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